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government were to establish a law school to train prosecutors in combating
corporate crime, regulatory agencies would be better qualified to curb corruption. With Larger budgets, regulatory agencies would have more muscle
to fmd and convict corporate criminals. T hese measures could help restore
the public's trust in U.S. companies.

The Sarhanes-Oxley Act: Investor Protection
through Corporate Governance
Nicholas Beckstead*

Tile Srti'brt!us-Oxley Act effictively responded to calls fo,. '"l!form following the

Enron fiasco and the dot-com collapse. Furthermore, the Sarbanes- Oxley Act
includes significant pretJentative measm·es to ensure corporate responsibility.

E

nron shocked the world when it unexpectedly declared the largest bankruptcy in American history. Mark Weisbrot, codirector of the Center for
Economic and Policy Research, wrote this after the incident:
This master trader of everything from energy futures to advertisin g space ...
went from munber seven on the Fortune 500 list of America's largest corporations ro a bankrupt fai lure in a matter of months.'

Enron reported a staggering $ 13.1 5 billjon in debt, yet some bankers
estimate that the unreported balance-sheet debt was near $27 billion. The
result was an enormous group of disgruntled employees and irritated shareholders, as well as wide distrust for the corporate system. Political leaders
called for reactive legislation. In the 2002 State of the Union Address,
President Bush expressed this sentiment:
Through srriaer accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements,
corporate America must be made more accounrable ro employees and shareholders and held ro the highest standards of conduct.l

* Nicholas Beckstead, from Sr. Paul, MN, is an applied physics major with a
biomedical emphasis. He is also minoring in math, chemimy, and philosophy. He
plans ro anend law school and pracdce patent law.
1 Mark Weisbrot, "America's Largest Bankruptcy," Alrernet,
12/ 1/03.
lmp://www.alrernet.org/srory.luml?StorylD= 12132; (accessed December I , 2003).
1 Presidem George W. Bush, Stare of rhe Unio n Address, Washingron, D.C.,
January 29, 2002.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act effectively responded co calls for reform following the Enron fiasco and the doc-com collapse. Furthermore, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes significant preventative measures to ensure
corporate responsibility. These responsive and preventative changes to securities regulations put adequate pressure on corporations co maintain ethical
business practices.
SARBANES- 0XLEY REsPSONSE TO CORPORATE SCANDAL

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act effectively responded to calls for reform following the Enron fiasco, as well as ocher recent corporate scandals. To begin
with, the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOA) made significant reforms to ensure the
accuracy corporate financial statements. Moreover, the SOA responded to
the need for warning periods before pension fund blackout periods in order
to protect employees' retirement funds. Finally, the SOA addressed conflicts
of interest for financial analysts co ensure ethical reporting and accounting
practices.
In response to the demands of market analysts, rhe SOA made significant reforms to ensure the accuracy of corporate financial statements. Not
only did Enron hide massive debt, it also published misleading financial reports. In order to protect invesrors, Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) analysts suggested tightening audit reports.·1 The Sarbanes- Oxley Act contains
provisions to encourage honest reporting. For example, when filing a periodic report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), §302(a)
of the SOA requires the CFO and CEO of the company ro sign an extensive
document certifying the accuracy of the report.• Furthermore, §404(b) of
the SOA requires the auditing committee to certify rhat there are no marerial errors in the report.~ T he SOA also mandates substamial increases of
criminal penalties for various kinds of financial fraud. For exan1ple, Title IX
of the SOA, entitled "White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements," increases the penalty for most types of corporate fraud from five years in prison
3

Bureau of National Aff.'lirs Staff. "Enron Fallout," Secttl'ities Regulation nnd

Lnw 34, no. 9 (March 4, 2002): 13-14.

4
Sarbanes-Ox:ley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide III, §302(a) (July
2002).
ssarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide IV, §404(b) (July
2002).
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to twenty years in prison.' Moreover, fiscal penalties are increased by as
much as five times, bringing corporate fraud fines to $5 million for a natural person or $25 million otherwise.- Heavy criminal penalties coupled with
close supervision will dissuade executives from publishing inaccurate financial reports.
[n addition to tightening financial reponing rules, the SOA responded
to the need for warning periods before pension fund blackout periods in
order to protect employees' retirement funds. During the Enron fallout, employees helplessly watched as the stock in their Section 40 I (k) plans plummeted in value during a lockout period while the plan changed
adminisuators. Meanwhile, since they were on a different plan, executives
freely sold their own stock. Analysts suggested a warning period before such
a blackout in the future.HLawmakers responded by including in the SOA a
mandatory thirty-day warning period before any blackouts and disallowed
insiders from making any securities transactions during the blackout.9 This
change will encourage investment and prevent unprincipled executives from
raking advantage of their employees.
Lasdy, in response to overspeculation caused by dishonest auditing during the dot-com collapse, the SOA addresses conflicts of interest for financial analysts to ensure ethical reporting and accounting practices. In its
beginning, the dot-com craze saw unprecedented success. Internet Initial
Public Offerings (I PO) went public and reached share values that were multiples of their offering prices on the first trading day. However, such dynamic
growth was almost definitely caused by overspecularion of market potential.1" The overvaluation of these companies resulted in a heavy plunge, especially during the final quarters of 2000. Recent research indicates that
much of the overvaluation of these shares resulted from analysts with

•Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide IX, §404(b) Quly
2002).
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tirle XI. §1106(a)
(July 2002).
8 Bureau of National Affairs Sraff, "En ron Fallout," 19.
Q Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law I 07-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide III, §306(a) (July

2002).

10 Harold S. Bloomcnthal. Snrbanes- Oxlq Act in Pmprctivr (Danvers, MA:
West Group, 2002), 10 l.
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document certifying the accuracy of the report. • Furthermore, §404(b) of
the SOA requires the auditing committee to certify rhat there are no material errors in the report.' The SOA also mandates substantial increases of
criminal penalties for various kinds of financial fraud. For example, Tide IX
of the SOA, entitled "Wh ite-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements," increases the penalty for most types of corporate fraud from fi ve years in prison
Bureau of National Aft1irs Staff, "Enron Fallout," Securities Regulation and
Lt1w 34, no. 9 (March 4, 2002): 13- 14.
•Sarbanes- OxJey Acr, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide III, §302(a) (July
2002).
1
Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Title IV, §404(b) (July
2002) .
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order to protect employees' retirement fi.mds. During the Enron fallout, employees helplessly watched as che stock in their Section 401 (k) plans plummeted in value during a lockout period while the plan changed
adm inistrators. Meanwhile, since they were on a different plan, executives
freely sold their own stock. Analysts suggested a warning period before such
a blackout in the future." Lawmakers responded by including in the SOA a
mandatory thirty-day warning period before any blackouts and disallowed
insiders from making any securities transactions during the blackour.9 This
change will encourage invesm1ent and prevent unprincipled executives from
taking advantage of their employees.
Lastly, in response to overspeculation caused by dishonest auditing during the dor-com collapse, the SOA addresses conflicts of interest for financial analysts to ensure ethical reporting and accounting practices. In its
beginning, the dot-com craze saw unprecedented success. Internet Initial
Public Offerings (lPO) went public and reached share values that were multiples of their offering prices on the firsr trading day. However. such dynamic
growth was almost definitely caused by overspeculacion of market potential.10 The overvaluatio n of these companies resulted in a heavy plunge, especially during the final quarters of 2000. Recent research indicates that
much of the overvaluation of these shares resulted from analysts with

•Sarbanes-Oxley Acr, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide IX, §404(b) Uuly
2002).
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Title Xl, §1106(a)
(July 2002).
• Bureau of National Affairs Sraff, '' En ron Fallour," 19.
9 Sarbancs-Oxley Acr, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Title III, §306(a) (July
2002).
'" Harold S. Bloornenthal, Sarbanes-Oxle_y Act in Pmptcrive (Danvers, MA:
West Group, 2002), 101.
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conflicted interests. Analysrs gave positive reporrs in order ro maintain business within the investment banking firm. Section 50 I (a) of rhe SOA gives
analysrs protections char will help produce reliable securities research. 11 The
SOA bmics analysts' supervision and evaluation even when they are nor involved with investment banking. More imponandy, when "employed by a
broker or dealer who [is] involved in investment banking activities," rhe employer may not retaliate against an analyse that produces a negative report. '~
These changes promote analyst responsibility and discourage analysts from
publishing inaccurate, bur favorable reports. As a result, analysrs will produce reporrs that are more trustworthy.
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES OF THE SARBANES- 0XLEY ACT

Along with responsive reforms, the Sarbanes-Oxley Acr includes significant preventative measures to ensure corporate responsibility. For instance,
the SOA creates an accounting board ro regulate accounting firms and their
professional standards. The SOA also creates unity and independence in accounting standards and mandates the separation of auditing and financial
services. Additionally, the SOA forces companies to disclose new information that helps i nvesrors ro make prudent financial decisions. Furthermore,
the SOA solidifies the role of rhe SEC, giving ir serious power to intimidate
offenders of securities laws. Finally, the SOA mandates some miscellaneous,
but impowuu, changes to securities laws char encourage corporate honesty.
These preventative measures of the SOA provide significant protection for
the American financier.
One of the major protective functions of the SOA is the concepcion of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB
consisrs of five members that are appointed by the SEC in conjunction with
the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. 13 The SOA
mandates that chis board "will adopt auditing, quality, control, ethics,

Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act, Public Law l 07-204 [H.R. 37631Tide V, §50l(a) Uuly
2002).
12
1bid.
13
Bloomemhal, 23.
11
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independence, and other standards for public accounting firms." •• The SOA
empowers the Accounting Board ro investigate public accounting firms and
place disciplinary sanctions such as suspension or revocation of the firm's
registration, disbarment of individual accountants, and harsh fines.'' T he decisions of the Accounting Board will assure conformity and compliance
among public accounting firms. Close inspection with a short leash will
faci litate reasonable trust in the corporate system.
The SOA also creates unity and independence in accounting standards
and mandates the separation of auditing and financial services. Under
§108(b), the SOA empowers the SEC to recognize as Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) any accounting principles that are set by a
standard setting body that meets the specific requiremenrs set out by the
SOA.' 6 In order to maintain independence of the standard setting body,
§ 109(b) mandates rhaL the standard setting body must be funded by d1e federal government alone, so char the standard setting body does not seek contributions from any accounting firm.'" Furthermore, §20 I (g) of the SOA
also reaffirms the professional standard of separation of audit services and
financial services by designating that, in order to prevent conflicts of interest in audjting committees, one firm cannot perform both services.'s Uniform accow1ting standards and unbiased auditors will help ensure accurate
financial sratemenrs.
In addition to creating unified accounting standards and maintaining
unbiased auditors, the SOA also forces companies to disclose new information that helps investors make prudent financial decisions. Section 401 of
the SOA also requires companies to publish the qualifications of the members of their audit committees in rheir periodic reports. If there is no financial expert on the audit committee, the report must explain why there is no

14 Ellen S. Friedenberg, John K. Hoyns, and Gloria W. Nusbacher, Ov~rvinu of
the Sarban~s-Oxky Act (Newark, NJ: Manhew Bender and Company), 6.
11 Bloomenthal, 27, 34.
11' Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public L1w 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Title I, §108(b) (July
2002).
•·sarbanes-Oxlcy Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide I. §109(b) (July
2002).
"Sarbanes- Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 37631Title II, §20l(g) (July
2002).
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bur important, changes to securities laws that encourage corporate honesty.
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consists of five members chat are appointed by the SEC in conjunction with
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2004]

14 Ellen S. Friedenberg. John K. Hoyns, and Gloria W. Nusbacher, Overuiew of
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Bloomenthal, 27, 34.
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expert. 19 Moreover, the SOA mandates that companies must disclose a code
of ethics or, in the absence of such a code, explain why one has not been
adopted. 20 These regulations allow investors to scrutinize the accuracy of the
reports made by the companies in which they invest.
Along with requiring important new information in financial reports,
the SOA solidifies the role of the SEC, giving it serious power to intimidate
offenders of securities law(s). It allows the SEC to disqualify lawyers and
accoumants who knowingly or negligently violate securities laws. Under
§305(a) of the SOA, the SEC may bar an officer or director from serving as
the officer of a public company if that officer demonstrates "unfitness" rather
than "substantial unfitness. " 21 In addition, the SEC may apply severe fiscal
penalties to executives who break securities laws:
If an issuer is required to restate its financials as a result of misconducr, rhe CEO
anJ rhe CFO of the issuer must reimburse the issuer for (I) aU bonus or or her
incenrivc-based or equity-based compensarion they received during the 12
monrhs following rhe firsr public issuance or filing of the incorrecr financial
sraremenrs and (2) any profirs they realized from rhe sale of the issuer's securiries during rhar period."
Fiscal penalties become even more severe because any debt amassing as
a result of violations of securities laws can nor be expunged in bankruptcy. 2·1
The overwhelming disciplinary power of the SEC will encourage obedience
to securities regulations and thereby facilitate investor trust in corporate
organizations.
Finally, the SOA mandated some miscellaneous, but important, changes
to securities laws that encourage corporate honesty. To prevent record destruction, the SOA requires auditing firms to keep records for five years/'
and it creates new penalties for destroying official documems.z> Also,
" Bloomenrhal, 40-41.
2
°Carolyn Kay Brancato and Christian A. Plath, Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era (Washington, D.C.: Conbence Board,
2003), 86.
21
Sarbanes- Oxley Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Title III, §305(a) Uuly
2002).
22
Friedenberg, Haynes, and Nushbacher, 6.
23 Bloomenrhal, 141.
l• lbid., 139.
25
Friedenberg, Haynes, and Nushbacher, 8.
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rotation of the lead audit partner or the second review audit partner is required once every five years. 2~ This encourages auditor skepticism, independence, and honesty. Lastly, the SEC provides new protections for
whistle-blowing employees in order to discomage retaliation from managemenr.r The sum of rhe preventative legislation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
pressures corporations to follow the securities regulations laid out by the federal government.
ADEQUATE PRESSURE

The corporate governance reforms made in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
effectively and efficiently protect investors. On the topic of corporate legislation, National Bureau of Economic Research researchers empirically conclude that "strong investor protection is associated with effective corporate
governance." 28 The substantive reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represent
significant investor protection. Obviously, it is impossible to completely protect investors from unprincipled business practices; no law or regulation can
ensure totally honest business practices. Moreover, if policymakers create
more business regulations, then businesses will spend more time complying
with legislative standards. At a certa.in level, more corporate governance
means less productivity; it is impossible to quantify this level of pressure.
Therefore, the best policy of corporate governance is to respond to observed
flaws in the corporate system and prevent orher foreseeable flaws. This way,
corporate regulations can protect investors without interfering with daily
business transactions. Some of the harm associated with corporate scandals
could be eliminated without burdensome legislation. Bureau of National
Affairs analysts remarked:
Whatever the cause of the Enron Corp.'s collapse, many employees lose their reriremenr nesr eggs because their Section 401 (k) plans were roo heavily invested
in company stock. 29
" Brancato and Plath, 74.
rJbid., 82.
u Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny, Investor Pmtection: Origins, Conseqttences, RefiJT-m (Cambridge: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1999), 32.
2
'' BNA Staff, "Enron Fallout," 16.
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Bloomenthal, 40-4 1.
.w carolyn Kay Brancato and Christian A. Plath, Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Emon Era (Washingwn, D.C.: Conference Board,
2003), 86.
21
Sarbanes- Oxlcy Act, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763] Tide III, §305(a) (July
2002).
22 Friedenberg, Haynes, and Nushbacher, 6.
23 Bloomenrhal, 141.
2
'lbid., 139.
1
; Friedenberg, Haynes, and Nushbacher, 8.
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rotation of the lead audit partner or the second review audit partner is required once every five years. 26 This encourages auditor skepricism, independence, and honesty. Lastly, the SEC provides new protections for
whisrle-blowing employees in order to discourage retaliation from manageent.!' The sum of the preventative legislation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
pressures corporations to follow the securities regulations laid out by the federal government.
ADEQUATE
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The corporate governance reforms made in the Sarbanes- Oxley Act
effectively and efficienrly protect investors. On the topic of corporate legislation, National Bureau of Economic Research researchers empirically conclude that "strong invesror protection is associated with effective corporate
governance." 28 The substantive reforms of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act represent
significant investor protection. Obviously, it is impossible to completely protect investors from unprincipled business practices; no law or regulation can
ensure totally honest business practices. Moreover, if policymakers create
more business regulations, then businesses will spend more rime complying
with legislative standards. At a certain level, more corporate governance
means less productivity; it is impossible to quantify this level of pressure.
Therefore, the best poli~y of corporate governance is to respond to observed
flaws in the corporate system and prevent other foreseeable flaws. This way,
corporate regulations can protect investors without interfering with daily
business transactions. Some of the harm associated with corporate scandals
could be eliminated without bmdensome Legislation. Bureau of National
Affairs analysts remarked:
Wharever the cause of the En ron Corp.'s collapse, many employees lost their retirement nest eggs because rheir Secrion 40 l (k) plans were roo heavily invested
in company stock.'9
u Brancaro and Plath, 74.

-lbid., 82.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Yishny, Investor Protection: Origim, Consequences, Reform (Cambridge: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1999), 32.
'~ BNA Staff, "Enron Fallout," 16.
2
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When investors diversify their capital venn1res, the consequence of one
financial failure is substantially decreased. Therefore, smart investment practices combined with the protective reform of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act
provides reasonable protection for invesrors. The recent combination of substantive, responsive, and preventative legislation indicates that there is effective corporate policy pressure in the United States. These responsive and
preventative changes to securities regulations put adequate pressure on corporations ro mainrain ethical business practices, effectively and efficiently
protecting the prudent investor.

Corporate Scandals: Can Businesses Be Trusted?

Charisa L. Player"'

Some optimists will no doubt argue thttt companies, by and large, remain
trustworthy ... Howeve1; the presence ofmch n watershed offi-audulent nctivities hns brought nttention to some basic problems.

T

rust in companies has been destroyed in recent years, and rightly so.
Companies once hailed as headed by innovative geniuses and touted as
"One of the Best Companies to Work For" 1 have folded in incredible displays of mismanagement and fraud. Some optimists will no doubt argue that
companies, by and large, remain trustworthy. After all, only a small percentage of companies have had the need ro restate earnings and overhaul accounting methods. However, the presence of such a watershed of fraudulent
activities has brought attention to some basic problems. William T. Allen
said, "Enron is not just the hundred year flood offraud, but is in fact a warning that there are fundamental weaknesses that require immediate attencion. "2 This essay will (1) suggest that a particular sector of business is more
prone ro fraudulent activities, (2) analyze the role of employee ethics in the
downfall of a company, and (3) examine the viability of the proposed solutions for amending these fundamental weaknesses.

--

------

* Charisa Player has won several awards for her writing, including placing in
the Michael L. Rosten contest and the Disneyland Creativity Challenge. A mother
of three boys, she plans to enter law school in 2005.
1 Enron appeared in the rop 100 Companies in 1999, 2000, and 2001 in Fortune Magazhu. As discussed in "Resroring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A
Federalist Paper on Corporate Governance, Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Strucmre ro Curb the 'YeeHaw Culture' in Organizations," \.'!7oming Law Review 3 (2003): 400.
1 As quoted in ·The Enron Failure and Cor porate Governance Reform," Wake
F(Jrest Law Review 33 (2003): 855.
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